The Narrative Turn against Metaphor M etonymy, Identification, and R oger Boyle's Pa rthenissa A M E LI A ZU R C H ER R oger Boyle's Pa rthenissa, published serially" thro ugho ut the 1650s , is o ne of a group of mid seventeenth-century British prose romances that share a penchant for p olitical allegory. In keeping w ith generic predecessors such as Philip Sidn ey's A rca dia, Mary Wro th 's Urania, and especially J o hn Barclay's Argellis, these lo ng and narrati vely com plex ro mances use their fictio ns o f aristocratic lovers and soldiers to debate contemporary problems in ethics and political th eo ry and to represe nt natio nal and international political events. Most mid-century romance b ecame obscure w ithin a few years of the R estoratio n , but Parthenissa was read well into the eighteenth century, when by co nventi onal li terary history its outmoded genre would seem to have been replaced by the more sophisticated and entertaining form of the noveL Its extended popu larity was p robably du e in part to the notoriety of its author: R oger Boyle, brother of the now more fa mous R obert and a moderate R oyalist, was expected to go into exile after the execution o f Charles I, but instead defected sudde nly to O li ver Crom well 's employ in 1650 and becam e a member of Richard Cromwell 's inner circle, o nly to convince C harl es II at the R esto rati o n that he had been a loyal servant o f the crown all along . D oubtless part o f the attraction of Parthenissa's generically typical roman a clef fo m1 w as the access it seem ed to promise to th e inside story o f Boyle 's political career. ! But Parthen.issa is also intensely selfconscious abo ut literary fo rm and interpretati on, and at several moments it begins to construct a model fo r prose narrati ve stru ctu re that in retrospect turns out to have been oddly m o d ern . Against type, as it were, in these m oments Boyle blocks allegorical reading, substituting metonymic contiguity for metaphoric correspondence as the paradigm both for his own narrative structure and for the kind of interpretation it requires. In this essay I will read Parthenissa's pro nounced rej ectio n of metaphor as itself a metapho r, 73 speculating on its function for Boyle as historical fantasy and critique. At the same time, though, I will also approach Parthenissa's turn away from conventional figural representation on its own terms, as a gesture toward a kind of anti-interpretive poetics that has more in common, perhaps, with the narrative forms that followed it than with those of its own genre.
Romance in England after Sidney and Spenser was already established as a genre both allegorical and highly self-reflective, but Barclay's phenomenally popular 1621 Argenis (published in Paris in Latin, but written after Barclay had spent a decade in James I's court) lays out its allegorical mission with a clarity no imitator could miss. rn these troubled political times, declares the court poet who is Barclay's fictional counterpart, he will embark on a "new kind of writing" and produce a "Fable like a Historie," in which readers both famous and ordinary will see themselves "as in a Looking-glasse, " come to new understanding of the events of their time, and be moved to confIrm or reform their behavior accordingly.2 Like its exact contemporary Urania, by Mary Wroth, Argenis offers not only one-to-one representations of its handful of prominent readers but a collection of variously signifying episodes for its lay audience, which is supposed to realize Barclay's didactic aims by tracing both the internal correspondences of one episode to another and also their varied external correspondences to the world outside the narrative. rn the 1640S and' 50S romances such as Percy Herbert's The Princess C/oria and the anonymous Theophania followed this model closely, offering a variety of lightly fictionalized stories of erotic and military allegiance among their aristocratic protagonists in an effort to represent and thus rationalize the chaos of contemporary political events. Parthenissa adds another layer to the pattern, resorting to a collage of episodes and figures from ancient history as the starting point for its narrative. Embroidering liberally on information in Livy, Tacitus, Polybius, and Plutarch, Boyle takes as his ostensible subject the early life of the Parthian King Artabanes (historically, probably Artabanes II, whose reign is sketched only rudimentarily in Tacitus and Plutarch) and his friends and rivals in the Parthian court. Most of the romance's first and second books Artabanes narrates in retrospect to a hermit on a deserted island, while he is still a young man with few political responsibilities and is lingering in despair over the apparent loss of his beloved Parthenissa to a rival. Over the course of this set of his adventures, Artabanes tells the hermit, he has encountered Hannibal, Pompey, Marcus Crassus, and a whole host of lesser figures from ancient history, whose stories Boyle
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Boyle's historical m ethod makes it diffic ult to read Parthenissa as straight political roman a clef in the style of A rgenis and The Princess C loria. Indeed, in the dedication of the first book to Lady Northumberland, vi a a conventional disclaimer abo ut his inability to represent her tru e glories, Boyle disavows any allegorical refere ntiality fo r his characters and hints that rea ders should approach them instead as companions.
4 But Boyle's m ost extraordinary and sustain ed demonstration of his anti-roman a cl ef m ethod comes shortly afterwa rd in Book I , during Artabanes's acco unt of his life to the hermit. About sixty pages into his story, Artabanes and his servant, sharing narrative duties, begin reciting, in the firs t person, Plutarch 's acco unt of Spartacus, fro m his Life oj Ma rClls C rassus, and suddenly the reader, along with th e shocked and thrilled hermit, is brought up sho rt by the realization that Artabanes and Spartacus are the sam e m an. " 0 gods," cries the hermit, " is it then Artabanes ... who so fill 'd the world with his generous Actions, that not to have heard of him is as great wonder as any he perform 'd?" " This," repli es Artabanes's servant, with a gesture toward his master that functions do ubly w ithin Boyle's narrative fram e and his own embedded one, " is that same Spartacus" (89). Fleein g Parthia because of Parthenissa 's apparent infi deli ty, Artabanes had been captured at sea by Pompey and sold to th e R o man w ho trai ned Spartacus and o th er prisoners of war as gladiators, and from th ere he was laun ched on the bri ef career that to the hemlit is already legendary. At th e hemlit's urging Artabanes and his servant continu e the story, taking a detour into th e history of the Second Puni c W ar to bring Spartacus into contact with H annibal and one of his Capuan opponents, a you ng man named Perolla mentio ned o nly bri efly in Livy for his political opposition to his own fath er. 5 Artabanes embeds within his narrative the very long story ofPerolla's star-crossed love affair, recounted at one remove in the fi rst person by Perolla's lover an d eventu ally adjudica ted by Spartacus himself, and then he resorts again to Plutarch to narrate his own (that is, Spartac us's) last campaign against M arcus C rassus. At the point of Spartacus's ostensible death , obscure in the classical sources, Boyle has him resume the nam e of Artabanes and set sail for Parthia to rejoin his previous narrative traj ectory.
One of the few historical surveys of seventeenth-centu ry literature to take any account of Parthenissa, obedient to the allegorical hermeneutic norms that govern most seventeenth-centu ry romance, concludes that Artabanes is a " Spartac us-figure" (and both characters, as rebels against established autho ri ty, probably also fi gures for C romwell).6 A figure for Spartacus, however, is exac tly what Artab anes is not. On the contrary, in this scene Boyle brings together two characters from distinct and non-intersecting historical narrati ves and then, against all convention, asks the reader to understand th em not as parallel but as identical. It is almost as if Boyle se ts out to make entirely literal the representational proj ect Barclay provides for modern romance: as story-te lle r, Artabanes peers into the "Lookingglasse " of Plutarch 's account and finds not an alternative version of his story but his very own self Argenis and its gen eric heirs offer their audience a mimesis, a re-presentation; Par/henissa offers, in contrast, a model of absolute identificatio n-ide ntifica tion, that is, not as the mostly metaphoric process we often mean by the word, according to which a read er or charac ter feels such affinity with another's position that sh e sees the world as if throu gh the other's eyes, but rather a complete collap se of o ne character and his narrative into the identity and th e narrative of another. And the identifi cation occurs b etween characters who seem to sh are almost nothing. Not only is there no indica tion, before his capture by Pompey, that Artabanes has any militaristi c ambitions o r Spartacan cannin ess, but after his stint as Spartac us he reverts entirely to his identity as despairing lover, as if his own lege ndary feats had no thing to do with him. Within a genre that so freq u ently, carefully, and exph citly exploits the techniqu es of roman a clef, it is difficult to read this model of identification as anything but a deliberate dep arture, Boyle's notification that he m ea ns to block the kind of analogical correspondence romance has tau ght us to expect.
If the peculiar manner in which Boyle incorporates Spartacus into Artabanes's narrati ve will not allow us to read one character as metaphor for th e other, Parthenissa's Spartacus story is also antifigural in anoth er sense. In his ca reful revisio n of Aristo tle's relati on between plot and character, Julius Caesar Scaliger argues in his own I56I Poetics that while the good poet canno t be said to teach "character" per se, since in a typical plot "many things are done contrary to character," the poet does no netheless teach " disposition, " as nothing can be done in a plot unless a character is disposed to do it. " Action , therefore," Scaliger concludes, " is a mode of teaching," and disposition, th at which w ithin the plo t spurs a character to ac tion , is "that which [readers] are taught. " 7 While it would be going too far to claim that Scaliger reverses Aristotle's primacy of plot over character, it is clear that disposition for Scaliger-a kind of fore-conceit for ac tion, what he also calis, quasi-Platoni cally, a "form " or con ception-is the object the poet m eans to convey (7 .I.3), and that this fo re-conceit is lodged as finnJ y in the poet's hterary characters as it is in his o r her mind. Erich Au erbach's well-known
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9 If we combine these th eories, all part of the bedrock of early modern conceptions both of poetics and of psychology, it b ecom es possible to understand a character's disposition as itself a figure, an o utline that a wellconstmcted plot then fulfills through its action . Effective narrative needs to surprise its audi ence through anagnorisis, but it also needs to confirn1 the audience's expectation, in effect convincing the audience to be surprised at what, in some sense, it has know n all along. In the Ari stoteli an-Scaligerian tradition inherited by ea rly modern romance, character as figure is one of the essential tools in this task, a device by which poets m ay adumbrate and thereby justifY their design.
Early modern English narratives play self-consciously and frequently with this idea. Marlowe's Tamburlaine, for instance, is the playwright's exuberant retort to Scaligerian poetics, the warri or who outrageously defies any disposition that co uld possibly inhere in his shepherd-iden tity as he improvises himself into being, right in fro nt of the play's audience. Boyle challenges co nvention via a different path, by introdu cing into hi s n arrative a character wh o brings with him a long tradition of being dispositionless. Eventually w estern culture will adopt Spartacus as a historical figure-in retrospect he becomes an an ti cipatory paradigm for eighteenth-and nineteenth-century Europ ean movements against African slavery and imperialist domination, and even later (via Stanley Kubrick's ftlm) for the cause of gay liberation in th e United States 1°-but in the ea rly modern period he is still a cipher. In Plutarch and Appian, th e fullest classical sources, his story appears riddled with gaps and inconsistencies. He is a Thracian, known to the R omans and their sympathetic historians as mercenaries and cowards, and the success of his escape from the sure death of the gladiators' pit and then of his threeyear campaign against some of the best ge nerals R ome has to offer is seemingly without precedent, not only fo r a Thracian slave but for anyone. (As Boyle comments in his preface to the second part of Parthertissa, " Past ages cannot Parralell " him, " neither doe I beleive the Future will. "I I) In most classical acco unts his moti vations re m ain shadowy-pe rh aps he meant to challenge the Romans, but perhaps instead he was simply trying, Odysseuslike, to usher himself and his fellow-slaves back hom e . Appian asserts that after his fin al defea t by Marcus C rass us his body was never fo und, one last mystery in his mysterious life.
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By sidestepping the ancient prejudice against Thracians and offering a substitute for the frustratin gly shadowy account of Spartacus's death in the classical sou rces, Boyle's revisio n does ostensibly answer some of the problems in the histo ri cal record . It seems unlikely, however, that Boyle expected his audience to understand th ese changes as making any claim to facticity or adding m uch ballast to the conventional story. On the contrary, Parthenissa frustrates closure by emphasizing Spartac us's lack of disposition. Mid-century romance, as I have argued elsewhere, tends to translate characterological dispositi o n into self-interest, understood in earl y modern tho ught as the impulse toward those actio ns that it is most fundam entally in a crea ture's natu re to perfoml. 13 Parthenissa is less prepared than any other romance of th e period to offer an ethical justificatio n for self-i nterest and more conce rned to disengage fro m the necessity felt to inhere in interest: w here Cloria or Geo rge M acKenzie's Aretina condo nes self-interest as a tra nsparently ratio nal political mo tive, Parthenissa repu diates it as inimical to true frien dship . In this light Boyle's story of Spartacus might be read as Parthenissa's epitom e. Spartacus becom es a rebel by accident, because he is at th e wrong place at the w rong tim e in his melanch oly wa ndering. He has no intention of chall engi ng the R oman empire, and indeed , near the close of his campaign he chooses not to adva nce on the city of R o me beca use he does not wish to " insult" his enemy. Apparently without ambition or any kind of desire that could establish a traj ectory for him, in Boyle's account he fails even to effect the suicide he has planned, via hand-to-hand combat, because the oppo nent he has li ghted o n turns out to be an old friend from Parthia who refuses to fight him . It is Spartac us's nature in Parthm issa, even more than in the classical sources, to be inadequate to his own extravagant story; that he is so exactly adequ ate to Artabanes is Boyle's M arlovian j oke at the expense of conve ntional figural narrative.
J acques Amyot, in th e preface to his French editi o n of Plutarch's Lives, whi ch Thomas N o rth includ ed when he translated Amyot's editi on into English in 1579, asserts that the distinguishing feature of " Jives," as opposed to histori es , is that they represent no t men's " doings and adventures" but their "consultacio ns ," " the things that proceede from within" and lead them to do what they do. 14 " Lives," for Amyot, are about Scali gerian disposition at least as mu ch as Aristoteli an ac tion. If it is fa ir to assume that Plutarch's Lives was understood in the earl y modern period as a sustained
The Narratille Turn against Metaphor: Boyle's Parthenissa 79 examination of disposition, then even in its relation to its source, Parthenissa's ftrst book seems to work aggressively against type. Not onJy does Boyle ostentatiously signal, by Spartacus's relation to Artabanes, that we are not to read the heroes as conventional allegorical ftgures for one another, but he also resorts to a veritable catalogue of dispositions from which to borrow his dispositionless character. In one of the anti-romances following on Charles Sorel's parodic The Extravagant Shepherd (1627-28; translated into English 1654) such ironic emphasis might be its own end, but Parthenissa is too welldisposed toward romance, and too interested in its hermeneutics, for the reader to stop there. If Boyle's characters are not allegorical representations of one another, and the narrative of one is not constructed as a reflection of that of the other, how might Parthenissa work instead? Or, to put the question another way, what alternative hermeneutic does the romance make visible?
For modern readers, one obvious starting point is the antithesis between metaphor and metonymy that RomanJakobson famously posits as the structural foundation of virtually all semiotic systems. Extending ftgural analysis from words and tropes to the far broader category of topic, which in practice comes to include even character, Jakobson argues that every topic jn a given discourse is in ftgural relation to another, and that all ftgural relations can be reduced to two primary kinds-metaphor, which relates topics by similarity, and metonymy, which relates them by contiguity. Adapting Saussure's system of axes, Jakobson plots metaphor on the vertical, synchronic axis of "selection" and metonymy on the horizontal, syntactic, diachronic axis of "combination." Metaphor, for Jakobson, is a signifying practice essentially independent of time (polysemy is a state, not an event), while the process of metonymy cannot unfold except through time, as one topic follows or precedes another. 15 Following Saussure, Jakobson holds that selection connects terms "in absentia," terms "conjoined in the code [i .e., Saussure's langue] but not necessarily in the message [parole] ," while metonymic combination conjoins terms "in the actual message" (119). Even Jakobson cannot quite sustain this absolute djstinction between metaphor and metonymy-as he concedes elsewhere, "any metonymy is slightly metaphoric and any metaphor has a metonymic tint" 16-but he does claim that one or the other tends to predominate in a given Literary form . In general he associates poetry with synchronic, selective metaphor, and prose (by which he seems to mean mainJy narrative) with diachronic , syntactic metonymy.
Jakobson insists on the ftgural nature of both metaphor and metonymy, but there are moments in his work that provoke the sense metonymy might be somewhat less fi gural than metaphor. Although he argu es that both metaphor and metonymy can " revitalize" conventional perception or conception, which is part of what he believes art mea ns to do , nevertheless in line wi th many theorists after him (and with the American N ew C ritics' preference for poetry ove r prose) he finds m etaphor to be more revitali zing, because "selection" seems to him m ore agential or creati ve than combination.
17 As a result, h e says, narrative featuring a high degree of contiguous relatio n can give the impression that it is operating on autopilot, independent of a shaping consciousness-one result of whi ch, as he notes in a fasc inating essay o n Pasternak, is that active, agential voice and even agential character often seem to drop out of hi ghly metonymic narrative.
IH Jakobson wants to retain the complex syntactical possibilities of m etonymic combination, and he tries to avoid reducing contiguity to simpl e parataxis. At the sa me time, tho ugh , th e relation described by meto nym y atJakobson's pole, purified of selection (a limit case, as he co nc edes, not achi evable in practice), seems to co nsist of little more than nearness, so that tautologically, contiguity at this extreme signifies little beyond itself Unlike m etaphor, at its limit metonymy seems virtually nonfigural, right at the bo undary where words stop being in relation. Jakobso n's theory has been criticized for its reductive generality, whi ch leads him into ove rsimplifications and inco nsistencies particularl y on th e subj ect of metapho r. But his use o f figuration as itself a m etaphor, if rarely precise in a theoretical co ntext, is often usefull y suggestive, and for my purposes here his broad dichotomy b etween metaphor and metonymy offers a provocative characterization of a central antithesis in early modern narrati ve . Ifwe apply J akobson 's logi c to narrati ve structure in a broad sense, we might call narrati ve metaphoric insofar as its characters and episodes refer to stori es and ideas o utside the narra tive proper (such as roman a clef or parable) or functio n internally as versio ns of one another (as in Shakespearean drama, which fam o usly addresses one qu estion in several different contexts). Or, we might call narrative metapho ric to the extent that its acti on or resoluti on can be seen to " fulfill " the shape it outlines at the outset thro ugh devices such as characterological disposition, in the model I traced earli er that emphasizes dispositio n. Separately or together, th ese three optio ns pro bably characterize th e large m aj o rity of literary narratives. By contrast, we ca n call m eto nymic the narrative that foregrounds local , immediately contiguous relatio n and generates its fo rm through the co ntinuous unfolding of events. Narrative is metonymic insofar as its elements are linked by " and then," J akobson's quintesse ntial paratactic tool.
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In general, wh at I am calling metaphori c narrative tends to produce a pronounced readerly impression of agency. In any metaphorical structure, the vehicle delivers us to the tenor, but the process also w o rks the o ther w ay, the fac t of the tenor bringing th e vehicle more closely into focus as such , and for this reason metaphori c narrative shows a significa nt degree of self-refl ecti o n , a quality often realized or emphasized thro ugh a strong narratorial presence. (The many defi nitions of literary language as intrinsically self-refl ective-J akobson himself makes this poi n t-privilege metaphor over meto ny m y. 19) Correspo ndingly, and perhaps too beca use selection can be understood as more agential and creative than combinatio n , as I suggested earlier, there is a stronger readerly presumptio n of design behind metaphoric narrative, whether authorial or divine. Insofar as arrival at the tenor "answ ers" o r fulfills the vehicle, o r action ful ftlls character, metapho ri c narrative gives the impressio n o f being (or asking to be made by the reader) a closed , coh erent system, one that has been " th o ught" in advance. All th ese traits co ntribute to the sense th at metaphoric narrative represents or inhabits a realm governed by aestheti c necessity (thematic or, more prestigiously, fo rmal), ra ther than by co ntingency-witnessed , for instance, in Angus Fletcher 's descriptio n of all egori cal fi gures as agen tive " daemo ns" bent on realizin g their signi fYing destiny, or Paul de M an 's association of m etaphor and analogy with necessity in contrast to co ntigui ty 's openness to chance. 2o In literary history, metonymic narrative is most o ften metaphoric narrative's poo r relation. Its plot appears to have been put in motion by accident, ra ther than by destiny or the interests and designs of a narrator, and it proceeds as if in dependent of a narrator's guiding hand, sometimes seemingly even w itho ut any narrati ve voice. Like Spartacus's story in Parthenissa, w hi ch d oes no t answer or refl ect anything in Artabanes's before it, th e elements in m etonymic narrati ve seem conn ected o nly arbitrarily, as if th ey happened to fall along the same lin e by pu re chance. At its most extrem e such narrati ve appears simply to describe the world as it presents itself randomly thro ugh time, in an endless paratactic sentence that is as fa r as ca n be from Aristotelian plot.
This antith esis in narrati ve stru cture is paralleled by the ea rly modern generi c antith esis betwee n epic and romance. Epic will not m ap exactly onto m etaphoric narrati ve as I have been describi ng it, but there are several similarities : m ost significantly, epic's emphasis o n destiny and teleology; the allego rical relations it establishes am o n g its own narrative, those o f it pred ecessors, and hi story; and its tendency to ratio nalize its represented world into a coherent system of analogies (the paradigm for w hich , by David Quint's powerful analysis, is the A eneid's elaborate analogic structure) .21 At the other end of the dichotomy, many of the faults for which prose romance is often blam ed, from the seventeenth century onward-its linking of o ne episode to the n ext by little m ore than parataxis, its attraction to contingency and avoidance of cl osure, its lack of literary self-consciousness-belon g to m eto nymic structure. Broadly speaki ng, it seems fair to say that if all prose narrative is to SOlTle extent metonYlTll C, as Jakobson hypothesizes, th en early modern prose romance (and much medieval romance before it) is especially so. Those early modern romances that aspired to cultural prestige within a narrative culture that intensely privileged typ ology and allegory over other forms of representatio n-Sidney's epic revisioning of the genre, fo r instance, or M ary W roth 's ca nny adaptation of episodic structure for allegori cal purposes-had to w o rk hard to positio n th emselves well away from the metonymic end of the continuum.
If my application of Jakobson's bipolar fi gural schem e to early modern narrative structu re were simply another way to name the fa miliar antithesis between epic and rom ance, it would not be of mu ch use. Its valu e inheres, instead, in the m odel it offers for reading early modern prose, especially romance. Interpretive criti cism , as J akobson notes, is itself a metaph oric disco urse, a " meta-language" w ith the aim of inscribing another version of its obj ect, and insofar as it mirrors poetry's own metapho ric operatio n it constru cts a " homogeno us" system that answers the critical drive for coherence and closure. Jakobson calls for something "comparable to the rich literature o n metaphor" fo r m etonym y, but as he implicitly concedes, m eto nymy does no t call fo r interpretation as such-indeed, an interpreted metonym has become a m etapho r. 22 As a result, attempts to read early modern prose figurally tend to privilege m etapho ri c stru ctures over metonymi c, even w hen they strive to constru e figu ration as something m ore than local ornamentation . So, for instance, in Brian Vickers's sophistica ted reading of figura ti on in Fra ncis Bacon 's prose, the local metaphors that stud the prose serve as analogies fo r and thus keys to the argumentative stru cture as a w hole. 23 Locating figuration at the level of narra tive stru cture itself, by contrast, focuses our attention on the seams between elements or topi cs in prose narrative, encouraging us to see the narrative as a complex system of episodic units in a variety of relations to one anoth er. Parthenissa, by this model, is the sum of a vast num ber of narrative units, through w hi ch Boyle makes a path by linking and differentiating them in a vari ety of ways . And J akobson's bipolar model rerninds us that analogy is not the only criterio n accordi ng to w hi ch relationship can be constructed: contiguity itself m ay be an ideologicalor aesthetic choice on the part of the narrator, with the po tential both to signi ty meaning and to structure rea ders' apprehensio n of the text.
In blocking the metaphorical correspo ndence that his fe llow romance-writers usually cultivate, th en, Boyle positi ons Parthenissa at w hat we might describe as the far meto nymic end of J akobson's continuum. By its nature Parthenissa's unusually metonymic stru cture offers little by way of internal explanation for itself, but even in the absence of self-refl exivity such a stru cture begi ns to make a demand on meaning. One of the central issues in recent scholarship on early modern prose narrative has been the relation between fi ction and history, a relation that in early modern tho ught seems only som etimes to have to do with their relative faithfulness to fac t. According to Mi chael M cKeon's no w all but canonical account, a large share of fi ctio n's energy in seventeenth-centu ry England is devoted to the "categorial instability" between itself and history-a n uncertain ty about the essential distinctio n between th em-that is n ot successfully resolved until the novel emerges around 1720 to define history as factual in contradistinctio n to the novel itsel f.
24 Extending McKeon's logic, w e might read Parthenissa's juxtaposition of Spartacus's ostensibly historical narrative with Artabanes's fi ction al one, a juxtaposition too dramati c to be merely naIve, as instead ironic, a recognitio n that fi ction and history can no longe r be m etapho rically assimilated into one another. Itself a metaphor, that is, Boyle's metonymic link between Spartacus and Artabanes would signity a more general tension in seventeenth-century narrative between fac tu al history and imaginative fi ctio n, and an effo rt to open that tension to scrutiny.
Fro m the retrospective point of view of the novel such an interpretation seems sensible, but I am doubtful that fac ticity was really at issue for Boyle. In his preface to The Princess C loria, Percy Herbert argu es that romance is the only ge nre in which it is possible to express such histori cal events as those of the r640s and ' 5 0S that dety belief, and by this dictum Parthenissa's incorporatio n of Spartacus's unp recedented and unacc ountably successful rebellion looks not anomalous or random but entirel y appropri ate.
25 For Herbert it is no t romance's fi ctitiousness that separates it from other kinds of narrative but its departure from probability, a quality that history predicated on fac ticity sometimes shares, as Boyle may mean to point out in borrowing Spartac us for ro mance. As I have suggested, Boyle and Herbert were both working in the quasi-Aristotelian tradition ofScaliger, whose influenti al Poetics classifies all discourse as philosophical, rhetori cal, or pleasing, and puts fiction and history together in the last category as dual exampl es of n.arratio, by its very nature delightful. Fo r Scaliger fiction is distinct fro m histo ry as much beca use it is instructive as because it lac ks basis in fac t-an idea that Philip Sidney, of course, would later develop at length.
26 And Scaliger comes close to arguing that the obj ec t of fi ction's mimesis is itself imaginary, that the " fo rms" the poet imitates are found chiefl y no t in nature but in other texts.
27 M y point is no t that early modern thought lacked any distinction between history and fic tio n o n the gro unds of facticity, but rath er that there is generi c and h em1eneutic context for Boyle that makes fac ticity onl y one criteri on by whi ch th e two genres might be differentiated fro m or likened to one another. lndeed, in the preface to the second part of Parthenissa Boyle concedes that he violates historical veracity by putting Hannibal in the sam e tim e frame with Spartacus, but also counters that the lessons usually offered by the stories of these two men are in no way vitiated by his own narrati ve play.28 Fictio n in Parthenissa may no t be an allegorical figure for history, but neither does it get in history's way, beca use history for Boyle i· s a series of episodes that retain th eir nature and valu e in a va riety of settings .
If th e point of Boyle's metonymic structure, th en, is not to draw sp ecial attention to any distinction between fi ction and history, w hat else might it signify? Besides its episodic and open-ended nature Parthen.issa manifests several of the o th er characteristics J akobson assoc iates with m etonymic narrative, especially its disinclinati on to represent narratorial agency. One of the striking formal fea tures of mid seventeenth-centu ry ro mances such as C loria, Eliana, and Aretina, in compariso n w ith their predecessors by Ariosto, Spenser, and Sidn ey, is that they rarely foreground their authorial narrators, but Parthenissa takes this to an extrem e, reco unting almost all of its plo t via fi rst-perso n reminiscence by its characters and sometimes embedding its stories three frames deep. Boyle's romance also echoes at the level of theme th e metonymic associatio n with " free" pl ots rather than th ose that present themselves as governed by necessity or fa te. O ne of the central arguments of Parthenissa's m ale lovers, for instance, is that male fri endship is ethically superior to heterosexual erotic love, o n the (Montaignean) grounds that it proceeds from " inclinatio n," by w hich Boyle means som ething close to reasoned choice, as o pposed to the seeming fa tedness of erotic love (e.g. 566,
573) .29
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As we might expect of someon e enslaved, Boyle's Spartac us himself asse rts the value of fre edom , but in oddly narrative terms. Contemplating a m arch on Rome, he tells his company that its real advantage would lie not in vi ctory but in its indicatio n to the Romans that the rebels act according to " o ur election, not our n ecessity" (242), that they transcend the narrative ambit usually prescribed for slaves. Sho rtly thereafte r Spartac us decides against the march , because if he wo n he w ould insult the Romans and because, as his servant concludes, he is suffused by a deep " Melancholy" (244). Spartac us's repeated disinclination or inabili ty to act, w hich is echoed by several of Boyle's other heroes, mi ght seem at odds with his valo rizati o n of freedom , but it m ay well have been m ore conventi o nal in the early modern p eriod, nervous as it was about the ethics of a self-interest indep endent o f providence or community, to assoc iate agency with n ecessity than with choi ce. We mi ght think, fo r instance, of the stoi c embrace of necessity as the only basis for virtuo us, disinterested agency. T hrou gh o ut Parthenissa its h eroes express the wish to free th em selves fro m n ecessity and fate, but like Boyle-as-narrator, hiding in the w ings , th ey are relu ctant to claim their own interest and th e co rrespo nding power of design. P erhaps, w ith Jakobson, we can read this reluctance as a sort o f psychologization o f m eto nymic stru cture, or, vice versa, as the thematic gro und for the fo rmal abstractio n into m etonymy. Ironically, the correspondence of the two pro vides evidence of an urge toward metaphoric coheren ce that may be inescapable in narrative.
There are also several possible an alogues available outside the tex t for Parthenissa's m etonymic structure. One is what we kno w of Boyle's biography: as [ noted earlier, he took th e R oyalist side until 1650, w hen , probably en route to France, he was arrested and " persuaded " by C romwell to switch all egiance, and then at the R estoration he som e how m anaged to restore himself to royal favor and became a servant o f th e crown in Dublin . Throughout Boy le's political career his o pponents derided w hat they too k to be his expedience. Tho ugh it is p ossible o nly to speculate, a person w ith his history mi ght well have seen a reason to obscure o r disavow his own agency and self-interest, or (more ch aritably) have felt a sense o f his failure to effect his o wn narrative design in any theater but the m ost local . Another, more textual analogu e for the ro m ance's meto nym y is suggested by the w ork of revisio nist historians of th e mi d-seventeenth centu ry, w ho in the [980s and '90S criticized both Whig and M arxist accounts o f the peri od for being totalizing and detenninisti c. 30 In the revisio nist view the confli ct of mid-ce ntury was pro duced not by an ineluctable shift in the zeitgeist towa rd parliamentary d emocracy or against social oppressio n , but by myriad local tensions and events, working sometimes in harmony and sometimes in opposition. As in C larendon's History if the R ebellion and Civil Wars in England, reclaimed for its sense of the power of historical contingency, in revisionist history the execution of C harles I was almost accidental , the result of immediate constraints on and decisions by a sm all group of people who did not intend to kill the king almost until they did so. Part of the critique of conventional history revisionists meant to make is that co nventio nal historical narrative produces the effect of causality simply by stringing events along a timeline , which draws attention to their similarities and differences and in turn makes later events seem resp onses to earlier ones. One complicating factor is that not o nly characters in history and fiction but people in the world act as if they were in metaphorical narratives, organizing events according to the principle of causality in order to decide what to do next. To resist this tendency, revisionist historiography recalled us to metonymic narrative as I have been describing it, narrative that demands attention to the absence of anything but contiguity between or among its elements and denies the existence of coherent, systemic agency. A fully m etonymi c historical narrative, as revisionists well kn ew, would approa ch a contradiction in terms, if history 's task is conc erned with ca usality, and post-revisionist historians have recuperated long-term ca usality and insisted on the analogies, for instance, between social and political thought and between the ideologies of political elites and the middling sort.
3 1 But perhaps Boyle, like Clarendon after him , found at least some prec edent in the events of his own lifetime for a view of history as random and contingent, and perhaps, too, the attraction of that precedent registers not just a biographical but a more general cultural wish to escape historical agency or responsibility.
As I have been emphasizing, these ideol ogical motives for Parthenissa's structure are only speculative, merely hypotheses about w hat Boyle's metonymy might signifY as itself a figure. One of the questions Parthenissa challenges us to ask, by so blatantly blocking metaphorical correspondence, is w hether it is inevitable that m etonymy register as a metaphor, and here once again Boyle's treatment of the Spartacus story is illuminating. If Parthenissa's Spartacus does not call for figural interpretation, what does Boyle ask of his audience instead? In this case, as I suggested earlier, the answer seems to be identification. When Artabanes first acknowledges that he is Spartacus, Boyle has him pause in his account for a full page w hile the hermit models for the reader his wonder at encountering this historical legend in th e very o The Na"atilJe Turn against M etaphor: Boyle's Parthenissa 87 flesh. What is strange about the reader' s relation to Spartacus at this extended moment is that, with the hermit's, it feels unmediated by the apparatuses of narrative. In effect Spartacus steps out of his historical frame into Boyle's fiction, suddenly materializing in th e narrative present without any set-up or context. And in the state of surprise Boyle has fostered by withholding narrative preparation , we as readers are mo m entarily precluded from summoning up our own seri es of frames (Plutarch, ancient Roman history, tales of rebellion , etc.) with which to locate Spartacus and instead seem to join him there, as if we were suddenly inside the familiar story ourselves. Just as Artabanes identifies himself absolutely with Spartacus, so our world seems to becom e conflated for an instant with the narrative we are reading, Barclay's mirror dropping away.
This uncanny sense dissipates quickly, but Boyle reminds us of its presence several times in the romance, at various moments when our attention is brought to the process of reading or listening. One of the oddest is a brief episode recounted to Spartacus by Izadora, the fictional lover Boyle devises for Perolla . Izadora is in the middle of telling Spartacus her own complicated history w hen she pauses to discuss the remarkable Amazora, an inhabitant of a city H annibal besieged on his way to Rome. During the siege Amazora recognized th at th e city's women were consuming the limited supply of food without doing anything to resist H annibal, and tm e to her name she decided to rally all the women of the city "to whom Glory was more pleasing than Life" and lead a nocturnal escape over the city walls. Unfortunately Hannibal's army "cmelly murther'd" the entire party (11 I). When Perolla arri ved after the fac t and heard the story (before he met Izadora), he killed fifteen hundred Lybians in retaliation and then fell in love with the dead woman. Amazora's "Fire was of so peculiar a quality," recounts Izadora, " that w hen it had reduc'd her to ashes, those very R eliqu es retained heat enough to inflame him , and perhaps there has been seldom heard of a Love so strange in the Birth, in the Life, and in Death. For it was created by an object that was dead, the Effect remained w hen the Cause was taken away, and having no material sustenance to preserve it selfe alive" (1 II). In fact, Izadora generously concludes, ofPerolla's heart she herself has now "onely the reversion" (r I J)-a word that when used with th e definite article in this period often means a leftover, as from a meal (OED [[ 4.a) . lzado ra does not make any of the rationalizations about dead lovers usually summoned when new ones have already taken their places: Amazora did not lay the ground in Perolla for a better or even an equivalent love, nor did PerolJa turn her memory into a N eoplatonic stimulus toward virtue. On the contrary, though she was present to Perolla only through a story, she was nevertheless so real to him that she all-but-literally consumed a part of him, her "Effect" as material as the original "Cause."
As at the moment ofSpartacus's recognition, Boyle in the Amazora story seems to be trying to conjure an apprehension of literary or narrative character not as signifier or vehicle but as the almost-material real. Amazora will never join Perolla within his own temporal frame, but she acts on him as if she had, arousing all the responses that might be produced by a woman in the flesh. Boyle may find a precedent in Mary Wroth's r621 romance Urania, especially in the extraordinary moment when the Wroth-figure Pamphilia enters an elaborately allegorical palace and literally "metamorphoses" the allegorical figure of Constancy and the conceptual virtue she represents into her own breast, reversing the trajectory of much allegorical interpretation and hinting that character, rather than concept, must be the reader's interpretive endpointY But Boyle goes even further than Wroth, in that whereas Wroth sustains the sense ofliterary character as a mediator between conceptual idea and the real, extra fictional person in the world with the reader, Boyle reaches to put the reader on virtually the same plane with the literary I historical character. If metaphorical characters perform presence, reminding us of their distinction from the referent even as they assert their similarity, characters in Boyle's metonymic narrative simply assert it, as if to trick us momentarily into forgetting the artificiality of historical narrative, or of history itself Parthmissa's suggestion that reader and character might inhabit the same narrative frame, however briefly, is on the surface an odd mechanism toward identification. Usually readerly identification is associated with realistic characters, characters who through richness of descriptive and narrative detail resemble "virtual persons" and thereby seduce readers into believing temporarily that they have entered another wodd Y And realist characters, by most accounts, are metaphorical rather than metonymic. In Georg Lukacs's prescription for historical realism, to cite one well-known example, character must be "typical," by which he means not "commonplace" but "possessing capacities and propensities which when intensified illuminate the complex dialectic of the major contradictions, motive forces and tendencies of an era. " 34 Realistic character, for Lukacs, is a sort of microcosm, reproducing in little within itself the enonnous burden of history. Tzvetan Todorov too defines realistic character as metaphorical, arguing that the imputation of "psychology" that turns character from a mere narrative agent to a person is a metaphorical recapitulation of the narrative action. Whereas in "a-psychological" (pre-or no n-novelistic) narrative a state or quality of character is merely a precipitating conditio n, with no existence independent of the action it provokes (something very close to wh at Scaliger means by dispositio n), in psychological narrative such as the novel th e causal relation between psyc hological state and act is so " diffuse" that the psychological in effect detac hes itself from th e action , which was in fac t causally self-contained already, and shows itself to be a mirror, a " dupli cation," of the relations among th e various actions in the narrative. 35 Parthenissa, by contrast, is entirely lacking in the kind of historical and psychological detail cited by Lukacs and Todorov; not only is its character nonrepresentational , but there is no content, in the realist sense, fo r it to represent. But even so, Parthenissa suggests, the reader can be persuaded to believe for a mom ent that she inhabits th e fic tional fra me; aga inst o ur retrospecti ve, novelistic expectation , metonymi c narrative does have th e pow er to enlist the rea der in identification .
Identificatio n is a complex process, enacted in ma ny di ffe rent ways , and at fi rst glance B oyle's versio n might seem like a footnote to literary history, only one strange face t of a narrative unusual even among its historically obscure contemporaries. But Parthenissa's mode of enlisting readers, and indeed its metonymic strategies more generally, are probably not as sin gular as they appear. In concluding I want to glance at their similari ty to the narrative strategies of an early novel with profo und and as yet not full y understood debts to seventeenth -century rom ance, Samu el Richardson's Pamela. Richardson, as is well kn own, happened upon the proj ect of Pamela in the process of producing a conduct book , and in the novel he goes to great lengths to insist that he is only the edito r, not the author, of Pamela's histo ry. But Pamela is not a mimetically realist character, and in fact Richardson encourages readerly identifi cati on with her by means o f a mechanism quite similar to Boyle's . Like Spartac us's successful rebellion, Pamela's marriage to Mr. B is a social outrage, a narrative marvel that canno t be anticipated by such tools as characterly disposition. Pamela, following in the steps of all real romances, protests that it and its heroine are innocent of design: the novel has no autho ri al narrator, and Richardso n 's brilliant technique of having Pamela write " to the moment," in a m ode that parall els the sexual and social passivity forced upon her, means that Pamela cannot be said to know the narrative's ends or retrospectively shape its form any m ore than Richardson can. To the extent that readers suspend disbelief in readin g th e novel , th ey acqui esce not to Pamela's reali ty p er se, as a perso n in th e extrafi ctio nal wo rld, but to the narrative process by which the novel purports to be happening, its unfolding as if in the same " real time" in w hi ch its audience encounters it. Certainly the contemporary readers who made Pamela's character such a publishing phenomenon identified with her, when they did, in part as a form of social wish-fulfillment, and also probably because of her vulnerability. But rea ders also identify with Pamela because Ri chardson compromises our ability to see her as a type , a figure either fo r her audience or fo r the actio n in her own narrative. It is not accidental, in this context, that the strategy of the novel's skeptical debunkers from Fielding forwa rd has been to read h er m etaphorically. It becomes impossible to put ourselves in Pamela's shoes, Fi elding's Shamela insists, wh en we invoke the misogyn ist stereotype that Pamela must have been from the begi nning-th e schemin g, self-interested woman who buys her w ay with her sexuali ty-a nd w hen we recognize her as a type we see that her disposition has cast the novel's end as inevitable from its very beginning.
In a recent symposium on the problem of early modern dra matic character, J onathan C rewe observed that the popular (a nd to some extent even scholarly) sense of Shakespeare's characters as "virtual persons" seems to resist all attempts at theory. Although we know at some level that his characters are literary and theatrical effects, in m ost cultural fo ru ms we continue to treat them as if they were people in the world wi th us. This resistan ce, C rewe concludes, has proved so persistent that perhaps it is time to move fro m dismissing it as naiVe to engaging its history. 36 Parthel'lissa, I have been arguing, offers o ne episode in that history, a demonstratio n that "virtual persons " can be produced not just by drama and realist fi ction but by kin ds of narrative in which we have not exp ected them to appear. It rem.inds us too that identification is n o t just a default effect, the result of uneducated reading practices; o n the contrary, in B oyle's romance it is backed by its own technology, a complex set of metonymi c practices that may have more to do with the relation of romance to novel than we have yet understood.
